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Until relatively recently, comparative law tended to be rather dubious 
about the universalist possibilities of constitutional law.  The dominant 
paradigm in comparative public law until the late 20th century was 
particularism.  It found expression in Montesquieu’s skepticism that laws 
of one nation could be suitable for another because of the belief that laws 
must be appropriate to the people for whom they are made.1  Modern 
scholars posited that the transfer of political institutions from one country 
to another simply was not possible.2  Constitutional particularists 
contended that the intimate connection between a nation and its 
constitution meant that nations differ so much as a result of factors such as 
political structure, social organizations and legal culture that meaningful 
                                                 
* A comment on Professor Miguel Schor’s “Mapping Comparative Judicial Review” at 
the 2nd Osgoode Constitutional Law Roundtable: Comparative Constitutional Law and 
Globalization: Towards Common Rights and Procedures, Toronto, February 24, 2007.  
Thank you to Professor Peer Zumbansen for inviting me to participate in the Roundtable 
and to the participants for their insightful comments throughout the day and to Jamie 
Cameron and Richard Goldstone for providing comments on an earlier draft of this paper.  
A later version of Professor Schor’s paper can be found at Miguel Schor, "Mapping 
Comparative Judicial Review" (May 27, 2007). Suffolk University Law School Research 
Paper No. 07-24 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=988848. 
 
** Visiting Scholar, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
 
1 C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, A. Cohler et al., eds. and trans. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) 8-9 (Book 1, ch. 3). 
 
2 See Carl J. Friedrich, The Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad (Boston: 
Boston University Press, 1967) 10 (noting and critiquing this argument). 
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comparisons of constitutional law simply are not possible.3  In a word, the 
historical nexus between public law and national identity may not readily 
transfer to other countries.4  As a practical matter, the leading 
comparativists in the 20th century were private law scholars and the field 
of comparative law thus largely focused on this area.  This dominant 
particularist paradigm prevailed until the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent explosion of scholarship in comparative constitutional law.   
 The reinvigoration of comparative law in the early 1990s brought 
with it not only an exponential growth in comparative constitutional law 
scholarship but also the ascendancy of universalism over particularism 
within the field.  This school of thought is best captured in the words of 
one leading scholar that "the basic principles of constitutional law are 
essentially the same around the world...."5  There are strong links between 
this universalist constitutionalism and international human rights law.6  In 
addition, it possible to identify both a thick and a thin version of this 
universalism.  Thick universalism contains both normative and process 
claims.  It posits the strong universal application of specific norms and 
values as well as a global network that facilitates the communication and 
reinforcement of these values.7  In contrast, a thin universalism presents a 
                                                 
3 See C. Osakwe, "Introduction: The Problems of the Comparability of Notions in 
Constitutional Law" (1985) 59 Tulane L. Rev. 875 at 876 (stating that public law reflects 
inner relationship; spiritual and psychological connection with people); Donald P. 
Kommers, "The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law" (1976) 9 John Marshall J. of 
Practice and Procedure 685 at 688. 
 
4 See Osakwe, ibid. at 876. 
 
5 David Beatty, Comparative Law in Theory and Practice Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1995) 10.  See also ibid. at 15, 17, 105 and 142. 
 
6  See Mark Tushnet, “Some reflections on method in comparative constitutional law” in 
Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 67 at 69. 
 
7  Leading examples of thick universalism are Aharon Barak’s purposive interpretation 
(see Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2005)), David Beatty’s ultimate rule of law (see David Beatty, The 
Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)) and 
Lorraine Weinrib’s postwar paradigm (Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The postwar paradigm and 
American exceptionalism” in Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 84 and Lorraine E. Weinrib, 




more modest argument about universal values.  It recognizes the existence 
of a global network of courts as an interchange for ideas, but its focus is 
more on the universal nature of problems that courts face rather than on 
the norms to apply.  It is problem-based rather than norm-centred.8 
In this comment on Professor Miguel Schor’s paper “Mapping 
Comparative Judicial Review”,9 I assert that it is time to recall and 
embrace some of the particularist skepticism in comparing judicial review 
across legal systems.   In his paper, Schor uses mapping as a metaphor for 
the process of organizing various approaches to the comparative analysis 
of judicial review around the world.  The mapping metaphor is one that 
has been frequently invoked in comparative law at different times as 
comparativists have attempted to map the world’s legal systems into 
various legal families or traditions10 much as the way that cartographers 
                                                                                                                         
“Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism” in Vicki C. Jackson & 
Mark Tushnet, eds., Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2002) 3).  Other forms of universalism are referred to variously throughout 
the literature as “the Convergence Model,” “normative universalism” and the like.  See 
Vicki C. Jackson, “The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Comment: Constitutional 
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement” (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 
109 at 112 and Mark Tushnet, “Some reflections on method in comparative constitutional 
law” in Sujit Choudhry, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 67 at 68. 
8 Anne Marie Slaughter is the leading proponent of a thin universalism.  See e.g. Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2004) 1-15, 65-103. 
 
9 Miguel Schor, “Mapping Comparative Judicial Review” (Paper delivered at the 2nd 
Osgoode Constitutional Law Roundtable: Comparative Constitutional Law and 
Globalization: Towards Common Rights and Procedures, Toronto, February 24, 2007).  
A revised version of Professor Schor’s paper can be found at Miguel Schor, "Mapping 
Comparative Judicial Review" (May 27, 2007). Suffolk University Law School Research 
Paper No. 07-24 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=988848. 
 
10 See e.g. René David & John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: 
An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 
1978) (describing the idea of legal families and identifying the legal families in the 
world); Konrad Zweigert & Heins Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. trans. 
Tony Weir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) (same); Mary Ann Glendon, Michael W. 
Gordon & Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing, 1982) at 4-5 (explaining that comparativists “believe that the grouping of 
legal systems into legal traditions or families is possible because within every national 
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charted the continents and the oceans.11  The mapping metaphor has also 
been invoked literally, with one leading comparativist noting that “the 
legal map of the world today is not what it was in 1798, or in 1898, or 
even in 1989, and it no doubt will continue to change in the future.”12  
However, Schor departs from prior usage and proposes a different type of 
conceptual map.  His map focuses on questions rather than phenomena; 
Schor maps out the questions that scholars of comparative judicial review 
ask and assesses their answers.  As a general matter he finds their 
explanations wanting; they are often too polar or overly reliant on single-
variable explanations.  In short, in Schor’s map, the answers provided by 
the conventional accounts of judicial review are overstated.  This is the 
theme that I take up in this comment. 
While Schor rightly takes existing scholarship to task for painting 
judicial review with too broad a brush, I suggest that conventional 
accounts give judicial review too much prominence.  The indomitable 
quest for explanations for the conceptual “problem” of judicial review 
across different legal systems at times may be a solution in search of a 
non-existent problem.  This emphasis on comparative judicial review 
reveals the dominant theme in comparative law – especially in 
comparative constitutional law – which is the tension between 
                                                                                                                         
legal system there are certain constants as well as certain variables and identifying the 
three major legal traditions as the common law, civil law and socialist law tradition); 
John Henry Merryman & David S. Clark, Comparative Law: Western European and 
Latin American Legal Systems: Cases and Materials (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1978) at 2 (identifying three principal legal traditions in the world as civil 
law, common law, and socialist law). 
 
11 See e.g. Chester G. Hearn, Tracks in the Sea: Matthew Fontaine Murray and the 
Mapping of the Oceans  (New York: International Marine, 2002); Robert Kunzig, 
Mapping the Deep: The Extraordinary Story of Ocean Science (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2000); Thomas Suarez, Early Mapping of the Pacific: The Epic Story of 
Seafarers, Adventurers and Cartographers Who Mapped the Earth’s Greatest Ocean 
(North Clarendon, Vermont: Periplus, 2004); Nicholas Crane, Mercator: The Man Who 
Mapped the Planet, 1st Amer. ed. (New York: Henry Holt  2003).  See generally Nicholas 
Crane, The Map Book (Toronto: McArthur and Company, 2005).  See also Arthur J. 
Klinghoffer, The Power of Projections: How Maps Reflect Global Politics and History 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2006). 
 
12   Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al, Comparative Law: Cases-Text-Materials, 6th ed. (New 
York: Foundation Press, 1998) at 283. 
 




universalism and particularism.  Schor’s paper demonstrates how stressing 
judicial review overemphasizes its importance as a universal phenomenon 
in a manner somewhat similar to how our standard Mercator projection 
map centralizes and over-represents Europe at the expense of other 
continents.13  Here, I endeavour to demonstrate this argument through 
reflecting on a tale of two maps of my own.   
 
II. A TALE OF TWO MAPS 
A. THE FIRST MAP: THE MAPPARIUM 
 
In Boston – not too far from Professor Schor’s law school – there 
is an incredible map room like no other.  The “Mapparium” is located in 
the Mary Baker Eddy Library at  the headquarters of the Christian Science 
Center Publishing Society in Boston’s Back Bay neighbourhood.14  The 
Mapparium is by no means a conventional map room in the sense of a 
room that contains maps where one can go and spread them out on a table 
for examination.  Rather, the Mapparium is a map; it is a room that 
consists of a single map – or rather a globe.  This three-story room was 
built between 1934 and 1935, a time when the United States was in the 
midst of the turmoil of the Great Depression and Hitler was on the rise in 
Europe.  Designed by Boston architect Chester Lindsay Churchill, the 
Mapparium was based on Rand McNally’s 1934 map of the world.  To the 
visitor, it appears that the Globe has been turned inside out, with the map 
on the inside of the sphere.  The visitor stands inside the Globe – three 
stories of it – and is able to peer at locations in every direction.  It is a full 
three hundred and sixty degree cartographical visual experience.  While 
apparently some thought was given to updating the map from time to time 
– by the time it was nearing completion in 1935, the world had changed 
since Rand McNally’s 1934 version – the futility and the expense of 
                                                 
13 See Mark S. Monmonier, Rhumb Lines and Map Wars: A Social History of the 
Mercator Projection (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
 
14 Mary Baker Eddy was the founder of Christian Science as well as The Christian 
Science Monitor in 1908.  See generally Willa Cather, The Life of Mary Baker G. Eddy 
and the History of Christian Science (University of Nebraska Press, 1993). 
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attempting to keep the map of the world current resulted in the freezing of 
the Mapparium in time.15 
 The visitor standing on the glass bridge/observation deck 
traversing one end of the room to the other is propelled back in time to 
1934.16  Great Britain and her colonies and mandates are in imperial pink 
and other “mother” countries share the same colour with their colonies.  
The Mapparium alters one’s perspective, viewing the world in three-
dimensional terms from the inside out as it were.  The oceans have 
different shades of blue to denote depth, a frequent feature on maps which 
was critical for sailors, to say the least for divers.  The Mapparium is a 
remarkable work of art, stimulating thought about history, geography, 
politics and perhaps about comparative law as well. 
 
B. THE SECOND MAP: MR. FOSTER’S COLD WAR MAP 
 
 The second map fast forwards five decades from the Mapparium to 
my high school social studies class in Vancouver in the mid-1980s, i.e. 
during the end of Cold War.  Our class was taught by a relatively young 
and hippyish Mr. Dave Foster who was one of those rare teachers who is 
able to capture the attention of otherwise hormonally distracted fourteen 
year olds and succeed in inspiring a few of them.  Mr. Foster showed us a 
map of how Americans perceived the world at that time; it was a 
conceptual map more akin to the type we might use in comparative law.  
Not surprisingly, the size and centrality of the United States was hugely 
distorted.  Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were similarly inflated 
and described with the simple moniker “Commieland”; the Middle East 
                                                 
15 All references in this paragraph are based on a visit by the author to the Mapparium on 
February 18, 2007 and on the history of the Mapparium contained in its webpage online 
at http://www.marybakereddylibrary.org/exhibits/mappariumhistory.jhtml.  According to 
the website, “In 1939, 1958, and again in 1966, different committees discussed updating 
the map. In 1966, the estimated cost was $175,000 to create and install new glass panels. 
It was decided that the Mapparium held much more value as an art object, and the idea of 
updating was finally dropped.” 
 
16 The Mapparium is a three-dimensional encounter of experiencing maps as “a ‘window’ 
into times now passed.”  Lez Smart, Maps That Made History (Toronto: The Dundurn 
Group, 2004) at 14. 
 




was enlarged and denoted with the sole explanation: “oil”.  Africa and 
South America were shrunken, as was Canada with the simple denotation 
of “cold”.  A similar map traverses the internet entitled “The World 
According to Ronald Reagan” which offers much of the same perspective.  
The world is divided into “West (Us)” and “East (Them)”.  The United 
States is divided into four regions: a hugely disproportionate California, a 
tiny Northwest swath called “Ecotopia”, an oversized Northeast pocket 
called “Democrats and other welfare bums” and a rump east of the 
Mississippi in red and white stripes labeled “Republicans and other Real 
Americans”.  Great Britain (aka “Thatcherland”) is expanded beyond its 
normal size and Europe or “socialists and pacifists” lies in the red shadow 
of the USSR, referred to as “Godless Communists, Liars and Spies”.17 
 Mr. Foster’s Cold War Map was a useful tool of engagement to 
articulate who Americans saw in the world and how Americans perceived 
them.18  It was a simplistic depiction of what international relations 
theorists would describe in more conceptual terms as a bi-polar 
international system, almost to a reductio ad absurdum.  But in presenting 
the Cold War Map’s view of a bi-polar world through the eyes of one 
superpower (we might imagine a similar exercise from the Soviet 
perspective), the map is also notable for what it omitted.  The Cold War 
Map sees the United States at the center of a world struggle and in 
dividing the world into “us” and “them”, the perspectives of the “others” 
are literally diminished or excluded from the map altogether. 
 What is the connection between my two maps and Professor 
Schor’s mapping of comparative judicial review?  It is this.  In our own 
conceptual mapping of judicial review, we tend to exaggerate the 
importance of the problem of the legitimacy of judicial review in 
constitutionalism.  Like Mr. Foster’s Cold War Map or the World 
                                                 
17 For example, in this Map, Canada is grey and labeled “Acidrania”, Mexico is simply 
“Mariachi Land”, a tiny South America aka “Bananaland” is about the same size as the 
Falkland Islands.  The Middle East is divided into Israel and “Our Oil” with Beirut the 
only city in the region noted.  Africa is shrunken and Asia is simply “Their China” and 
“Our China” which appear to be roughly the same size.  See “The World According to 
Ronald Reagan” online at http://humor.beecy.net/misc/world/ or online at 
http://strangemaps.wordpress.com/2006/11/23/38-the-world-according-to-ronald-reagan/ 
 
18 For a modern version of the World According to Ronald Reagan, see the depiction of 
“George Bush’s World” online at http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/11/16/8490/2873 
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According to Ronald Reagan, we as comparative constitutional scholars 
tend to view the centrality of judicial review through the prism of the 
American experience.  By universalizing “the problem” of judicial review 
from the American experience, we may be creating a false positive in 
some constitutional systems as well as creating a false negative in others, 
missing other important features and elements in constitutional systems 
because of our collective fixation on judicial review. 
 
III. FROM THE PARTICULAR TO THE UNIVERSAL OR 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM? 
  
Comparative judicial review extrapolates the well-developed 
theoretical issues from the American context and applies them universally.  
A number of factors should cause us to question the extent to which the 
concerns raised in the American context have broader universal 
application.  As a starting point, the burgeoning literature on American 
exceptionalism gives us reason to treat extrapolations from the American 
experience with judicial review with some degree of skepticism.19  In 
particularly, we should begin by acknowledging the origins of judicial 
review in the United States, the centrality and persistence of the debate 
over its legitimacy and the politicized nature of that debate. 
 Judicial review was born in the United States.  The United States 
contributed a distinct conception of constitutionalism to the international 
community consisting of judicially-enforceable rights grounded in the 
power of judicial review.20  However, the text of the American 
                                                 
19   On American Exceptionalism, see e.g. Michael Ignatieff, ed., American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2005); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1997); Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy (New 
York: Palgrave. 2001); Deborah Madsen, American Exceptionalism (Jackson, MI: 
University of Mississippi Press, 1998); Jack P. Greene, The Intellectual Construction of 
America: Exceptionalism and Identity from 1492 to1800 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1993); and Harold Hongju Koh, “Foreword: On American 
Exceptionalism” (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1479. 
 
20   See Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 
xviii, 65 (“The United States is commonly acknowledged to be a principal ancestor of the 
contemporary ideas of rights”).  See also Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the 




Constitution is silent on the issue and it was not until the 1803 in Marbury 
v. Madison21 that Chief Justice Marshall declared the existence of the 
power of judicial review.  It was not exercised for a half-century until the 
infamous Dred Scott decision22 which contributed to the American Civil 
War.  Thus, it has been said that judicial review in the United States was 
“born in sin . . .”23  What is critical for comparative purposes is that 
judicial review originated with the Supreme Court, not with 
democratically-elected representatives and not within the text of the 
Constitution itself.  
 In the United States, the persistence of the debate over the 
legitimacy of judicial review and the centrality of that debate is notable.  
Former Stanford Dean of Law Paul Brest has rightly called the 
controversy over the legitimacy of judicial review in a democratic polity 
“the historic obsession of normative constitutional law scholarship” in the 
United States.24  Since before and after Herbert Wechsler’s endeavour at 
neutral principles,25 American constitutional law scholars have embarked 
on a collective quest for a theory of interpretation to justify judicial 
                                                                                                                         
World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, Mass. & London: The Belknap 
Press, 2005). On the American contribution of the Declaration of Independence to the 
global community see David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global 
History (Cambridge: Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007).  On the American 
conception of rights see Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York & 
London: W.W. Hunt, 2007) 113-126, 214. 
 
21 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 
22 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 
23 Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Law without the Constitution: The Supreme Court’s 
Remaking of America” in Robert H. Bork, ed., A Country I Do Not Recognize: The Legal 
Assault on American Values (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2005) 1 at 8. 
 
24 Paul Brest, “The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
Normative Constitutional Scholarship” (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1063.  See also Roger 
P. Alford, “In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism” (2005) 52 UCLA 
Law Review 639 at 644 (claiming that constitutional law scholars are “obsessed with the 
latest nuance of a grand constitutional theory”). 
 
25 Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” (1959) 73 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1. 
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review.  These include formalists,26 neo-formalists,27 originalists,28 
textualists,29 process-theorists,30 moral theorists,31 populists,32 
pragmatists,33 judicial minimalists,34 and many others.  There are also 
                                                 
26 See e.g. James Bradley Thayer, “American Doctrine of Constitutional Law” (1893) 7 
Harv. L. Rev. 129. 
 
27 See e.g. Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of 
Legal Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
 
28 See e.g. Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Free Press, 1990) and 
Antonin Scalia, “Originalism:  The Lesser Evil” (1989) 57 U. Cincinnati L. Rev. 861. 
 
29 See e.g. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, ed. 
Amy Guttman  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
 
30 See e.g. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1980); Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Frank Michaelman, “Law’s Republic” 
(1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 1493. 
 
31 See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1977); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1985); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1986); David Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Michael Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: 
Law or Politics? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
 
32 See e.g. Larry D. Alexander, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and 
Judicial Review (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Bruce Ackerman, 
We The People, vol. 1: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991); 
Bruce Ackerman, We The People, vol. 2: Transformations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1998); Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).  Richard D. Parker, “Here, the People 
Rule”: A Constitutional Populist Manifesto (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1994). 
 
33 See e.g. Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2003); Richard A. Posner, “Pragmatic Adjudication,” in Morris 
Dickstein, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essay on Social Thought, Law, and 
Culture (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: 
Interpreting our Democratic Constitution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005). 
 
34 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 




those that address the legitimacy of judicial review by calling for its 
abolition or its severe curtailment.35 
 The American debate over the legitimacy of judicial review must 
be considered in its larger political context.  American constitutionalism is 
deeply entrenched in American political culture in the sense of acceptance 
of the idea of a constitution as a limit on the power of the state.  In fact, 
constitutionalism in the United States is considered by some to be a form 
of secular religion.36   However, the exercise of judicial review as a 
component of constitutionalism – the power of the judiciary to strike down 
legislation as inconsistent with the Constitution – is not similarly 
entrenched.  To put the matter in starker terms, the constitutional debate 
over the ratification of the Constitution that led Publius to pen The 
Federalist Papers is now a matter of history.  There are vibrant debates on 
the meaning and interpretation of the U.S. Constitution but not about the 
validity of the document itself.  This is not the case with judicial review; 
its legitimacy continues to be questioned and debated.  
The legitimacy of the judicial role was an issue that confronted the 
framers and continues to define American constitutionalism.  The problem 
of legitimacy arises because of the apparent conflict between the principle 
of democratic accountability and judicial review.  In simple terms, the 
principle of democratic accountability holds that decisions relating to 
government policymaking which inevitably require choosing between 
competing values be made by persons who are accountable to the 
                                                 
35 See Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999) (calling for the abolition of judicial review); Lino A. 
Graglia, “Constitutional Law without the Constitution: The Supreme Court’s Remaking 
of America” in Robert H. Bork, ed. “A Country I Do Not Recognize”: The Legal Assault 
on American Values (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2005) 1 at 52-53 
(same); Robert H. Bork, Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American 
Decline (New York: Regan Books, 1996) at 117 (proposing constitutional amendment 
making any federal or state court decision subject to being overruled by a majority vote in 
each House of Congress). 
 
36 See e.g. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 1988). 
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electorate.37  A person may either be directly or indirectly accountable to 
the electorate.  As explained by Michael Perry:    
. . . a person is accountable to the electorate directly if he holds 
elective office for a designated temporary period and can 
remain in office beyond that period only by winning 
reelection; accountability is indirect if he holds appointive 
office and can remain in office only at the discretion of his 
appointer (who in turn is electorally accountable) or, if his 
office is for a designated, temporary period, by securing 
reappointment after that period has expired.38 
 
Elected representatives are directly accountable and many of their officials 
would be indirectly accountable.  A life-tenured judiciary is not.  Given 
the principle of democratic accountability, the question arises as to the 
legitimacy of judicial review.39  That quest for justification has been the 
defining feature of 20th century American constitutional thought, set off by 
Alexander Bickel’s characterization of judicial review as a “deviant 
institution” in American democracy and definimg the problem in terms of 
the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”40  Cappelletti referred to the “Mighty 
Problem” of judicial review.41  I refer to this debate around judicial 
review’s legitimacy simply as “the Question of Legitimacy” in 
comparative constitutionalism. 
The Question of Legitimacy in the United States is notable for its 
centrality, its intensity and its endurance.  It is a dominating issue 
                                                 
37 Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights (New Haven and 




39 See Perry, ibid.  For a leading article of this genre see Eugene V. Rostow, “The 
Democratic Character of Judicial Review” (1952) 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193. 
 
40 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) at 18. 
 
41 See Mauro Cappelletti, “The `Mighty Problem’ of Judicial Review and the 
Contribution of Comparative Analysis” (1980) 53 Southern California Law Review 409. 
 




jurisprudentially, academically and politically in the United States.  In this 
sense, the Question of Legitimacy continues to be more of a concern in the 
United States than in many other countries which explicitly adopted what 
might be termed “American-style judicial review”.  It has been sustained 
and perhaps elevated by the politicized nature of the appointment process 
of U.S. Supreme Court justices.  There is a political element to the judicial 
appointment process in all countries,42 however, what distinguishes the 
American judicial appointment process is the extent to which it is caught 
up in partisan politics.  American judicial nominees are part of American 
political theatre and are used as pawns in political inter-party and 
sometimes intra-party political warfare.  The effect has been to sustain and 
nurture the debate over the Question of Legitimacy in the political sphere 
which ensures a continued market for the academic writings on the issue.  
The Question of Legitimacy should properly be considered an 
aspect of American exceptionalism, part of the growing discourse on the 
uniqueness of the United States in international relations, human rights 
and political theory.43   In explaining the decision to exclude the United 
States from a book entitled Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of 
Rights: Comparative Perspectives, Philip Alston explained that “the 
American Bill of Rights is, in many ways, sui generis.  Because it is in a 
class of its own, experience under it offers fewer insights and less 
guidance than is usually assumed to those who are curious about the 
viability and optimal shape of bills of rights elsewhere in the world.”44  As 
I argue below, the Question of Legitimacy in the United States is also sui 
generis.  It has taken on a very different tenor in other legal systems. 
 
                                                 
42 See e.g. Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell, eds. Appointing Judges in an Age of 
Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2006). 
 
43 See sources cited supra note 19. 
 
44 Philip Alston, “A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights” in 
Philip Alston, ed., Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 1 at 6. 
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IV. THREE ALTERNATE ACCOUNTS OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 
 
In this section I describe judicial review in three countries: Canada, 
Israel and South Africa.  I argue that the nature of judicial review in these 
countries differs significantly from the United States and that the Question 
of Legitimacy has taken on a very different character in each of them.  In 
Canada, Israel and South Africa judicial review operates within the rubric 
of a common law system very much cognizant of the American model of 
judicial review.  Between the three countries we cover judicial review on 
three continents, with Europe noticeably absent.45  The review is by no 
means intended to be exhaustive, but rather informative beyond being 
anecdotal about the nature of the debate on judicial review outside the 
United States.  Together, the experiences of these three countries provide a 
cautionary tale about universalizing judicial review from the American 
experience.  In each of these countries, we can identify differences of 
history and context, constitutional structure and legal culture that reduce 
the centrality of the Question of Legitimacy in comparison to the United 
States. 
A. CANADA NOTWITHSTANDING 
 
We might expect the characteristics of judicial review in Canada to 
most resemble the United States because of the geographic proximity of 
the two countries, shared cultural and language bonds, and strong 
commonalities between the two legal systems. Many Canadian lawyers, 
judges, public servants and public policy makers have done graduate work 
in the United States.  However, the Canadian narrative and debate over the 
Question of Legitimacy differs significantly from the American 
experience. 
 To begin, historical differences between Canada and the United 
States are critical.  Canadians never declared their independence from 
Great Britain but rather came together to form a union under the continued 
                                                 
 
45 On judicial review in Europe, see e.g. Cappelletti, supra note 41; Alec Stone Sweet, 
“Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review . . . And Why It May Not Matter” 
(2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 201. 




aegis of the mother country and expressly sought a constitution “similar in 
principle” to it.46  Canada’s original Constitution – the British North 
America Act, 186747 – largely set out the federal structure of the new 
Dominion and contained few express rights.  While it is arguable that the 
federal Government and not the courts were envisioned as the arbiters of 
the boundaries of federal-provincial powers, the courts soon took on this 
role.48  In Canada’s first century, judicial review was about federalism.49  
Until the enactment of a constitutionally-entrenched bill of rights in 1982, 
the dominant theme in constitutional debates over judicial review focused 
on the proper scope of power to be given to the federal and provincial 
governments.50  In 1960, Canada adopted a statutory bill of rights51 but its 
impact was limited: it applied only to the federal Government and not to 
the Provinces and it was given a very narrow interpretation by the courts.52  
Only once in two and a half decades did the Supreme Court of Canada 
exercise the power of judicial review to strike down legislation as 
inconsistent with the Canadian Bill of Rights.53  The failure of the 
                                                 
 
46 Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, 
No. 5, preamble. 
 
47  Re-enacted and renamed the Constitution Act, 1867, ibid. 
 
48 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council first assumed the power to review the 
validity of legislation enacted by provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament on 
federalism grounds and the Supreme Court of Canada followed suit.  See Peter W. Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Scarborough: Thomson, 2007) at s. 5.5(a). 
 
49 Schor acknowledges that judicial review first developed in federal systems because of 
the need to arbitrate between federal and state (or provincial) powers.  See Schor, supra 
note 9. 
 
50 See e.g. Frank R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1977); Robert MacGregor Dawson, ed., Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-
1931 (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).  
 
51 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.   
 
52 See generally Walter S. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2nd rev. ed. 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975) and Hogg, supra note 48 at 35.5. 
 
53 See R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282. 
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Supreme Court of Canada to exercise judicial review under the Bill of 
Rights as well as the lack of hesitation of the Warren Court to do so south 
of the border provided an important backdrop for Canada’s enactment of a 
constitutional bill of rights – the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms – in 1982.  Canada’s adoption of the Charter in 1982 “was a 
conscious decision to increase the scope of judicial review.”54   
Key structural characteristics differentiate the Canadian 
constitution from its American counterpart on the Question of Legitimacy.  
In a critical distinction from the American Constitution which is silent on 
the question, Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 expressly bestowed upon 
the courts the power of judicial review.  Section 52(1) of that act provides 
that “the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any 
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.” 55  Further, section 24(1) 
of the Charter provides that “[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, as 
guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply  to a 
court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”  The express textual 
authorization for judicial review in the Canadian constitution significantly 
distinguishes it from American constitutionalism and on its own could be 
seen to largely resolve the question of the legitimacy of judicial review 
under Canada’s constitution.  In the words of Canada’s leading 
constitutional law scholar, “much of the American debate over the 
legitimacy of judicial review is rendered irrelevant.”56  However, 
Canadian attempts to address this issue do not end here. 
 When a judicially-enforced bill of rights was being debated in 
Canada between 1979 and 1981, the American experience with judicial 
review and the countermajoritarian dilemma were very much front and 
                                                 
54 Hogg, supra note __ at s. 5.5(b).  
 
55 Constitution Act, 1982 at s. 52(1).  See Hogg, supra note ___ at  5.5(a) (“[s]ection 
52(1) is the current basis of judicial review in Canada”) and s. 40.1(b) (“s.52(1) provides 
an explicit basis for judicial review of legislation in Canada.”). 
 
56 Hogg, supra note 48 at s. 39.8.  See also Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power and 
the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) 11-12 (“the basic legitimacy of judicial review has been 
less controversial in Canada for both historical and structural reasons”). 
 




center in the discussion.  Opponents of what might be termed “American-
style judicial review” feared giving courts the final say – always – in the 
determination of important public policy issues through the process of 
constitutional interpretation.  Their opposition to a constitutional bill of 
rights was tempered by the federal Government’s agreement to insert a 
“notwithstanding clause” into the Charter which would allow Provincial 
legislatures (as well as the Federal Parliament) to “override” certain 
provisions of the Charter (and immunize legislation from judicial review) 
for a limited period of time.57  The attraction found adherents in provincial 
premiers at opposite ends of the political spectrum who generally opposed 
constitutional entrenchment of a bill of rights.58   
 For many, the existence of the notwithstanding clause can be seen 
as conclusively resolving any apparent countermajoritarian difficulty in 
the Canadian context by giving the popular representatives of the people 
the final say in constitutional matters.59   It means than courts do not have 
a conclusive veto over legislatures.  As Peter Hogg explains, if an 
equivalent to Canada’s notwithstanding clauses existed under the U.S. 
Constitution, Roosevelt would have likely used it during the New Deal in 
response to the Lochner-era decisions, thus averting his court-packing 
plan.60  The conceptual success of Canada’s notwithstanding mechanism 
in responding to the Question of Legitimacy by providing a possible “third 
way” between parliamentary supremacy and judicial supremacy is perhaps 
demonstrated by the support that it has found among some of the strongest 
critics of judicial review in the United States.61 
                                                 
57 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11, s. 33. 
 
58 See generally Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or 
Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) 56-59.  
 
59 See e.g. Manfredi, supra note 56 at 188-195 (arguing that the notwithstanding 
mechanism promotes democratic legitimacy) and Janet Hiebert, Charter Conflicts 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002). 
 
60 Hogg, supra note 48 at s. 36.4(d) n. 44 (also noting that some decisions of the Warren 
Court would have likely been overridden by the government of the day). 
 
61 See Robert H. Bork, Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American 
Decline (New York: Regan Books, 1996) 117 (proposing constitutional amendment 
making any federal or state court decision subject to being overruled by a majority vote in 
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 While the notwithstanding clause may address the Question of 
Legitimacy in theory, in practice it has become politically illegitimate62 
and has not been used in the last two decades.63  That is to say, most of the 
experience under the Charter, enacted in 1982, has been without the 
operation of the notwithstanding clause.  This has moved the debate 
around judicial review to one about judicial activism and the proper 
relationship between the courts and legislatures, spawning a vast literature 
                                                                                                                         
each House of Congress).  On Judge Bork’s wavering about the idea of a legislative 
override see Robert H. Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (Toronto: 
Vintage Canada, 2002) 76-78.  See also Mark R. Levin, Men in Black: How the Supreme 
Court is Destroying America (Washington: Regency Publications, Inc., 2005) at 202 
(proposing legislative veto over court decisions with two-thirds votes of both Houses of 
Congress). 
 
62 The notwithstanding clause soon became caught up in the longest standing Canadian 
political dispute – between English and French Canada – as it was invoked by the 
Government of Quebec in response to a Supreme Court of Canada decision holding 
certain prohibitions on the use of languages other than French unconstitutional.  See Ford 
v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.  In addition, for a time the Quebec legislature included 
the notwithstanding clause in every piece of legislation that it passed as a sign of protest 
against the exclusion of Quebec from the 1982 constitutional deal.  In quick order, the 
notwithstanding clause which could have given a very different character to judicial 
review in Canada instead became the bête noire of Canadian constitutional politics.  The 
literature on the notwithstanding clause is vast.  See Hogg, supra note 48 at s. 39.1 n.1 
(listing articles).  On the rise and decline of the notwithstanding clause, see Manfredi, 
supra note 56 at181-88.   
 
63 It is arguable that a constitutional convention has developed or is developing against 
the use of the notwithstanding clause.  In the 2006 federal election, Prime Minister Paul 
Martin promised that if his Government was re-elected it would introduce legislation to 
prohibit the federal Government from using the notwithstanding clause.  See “Martin 
wraps campaign in constitutional pledge”, CBC News (10 January 2006), online: 
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canadavotes2006/national/2006/01/09/elxn-debates-look.html.  
See also Paul Wells, Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul Martin and the Rise of Stephen 
Harper’s New Conservatism (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2006) at 220-22.  Allan 
Hutchinson suggested to me that the lapse of time in the use of the notwithstanding clause 
may suffice to qualify it for desuetude along the lines of the long-lapsed constitutional 
powers of disallowance and reservation.  For a comparable analysis on the constitutional 
power of disallowance which has not been invoked since 1943, see Hogg, supra note __ 
at s.5.3(e).   
 




on the subject and focusing most prominently over the last decade on the 
concept of “dialogue” between the courts and legislatures.64   
 Canadian constitutional scholarship since 1982 reflects a sustained 
critique over the constitutionalization of rights.  The critics come from 
both the left65 and the right66 sides of the political spectrum and their 
criticisms focus, either explicitly or implicitly, on the constitutionalization 
of rights.   Scholars and commentators often exaggerate the political 
impact of judicial review in this process.67  The Canadian debate is not 
about the legitimacy of judicial review per se but about its proper scope 
                                                 
64 See Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and 
Legislatures” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 76.  Hogg & Bushell’s dialogue theory 
spurned a cottage industry of commentary.  See F.L. Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue?” 
(1999) 20(3) Policy Options 23; Janet L. Hiebert, “Why must a Bill of Rights be a 
Contest of Political and Judicial Wills?” (1999) 10 Public Law Review 22; Christopher P. 
Manfredi & James B. Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and 
Bushell” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513; Peter W. Hogg and Alison A. Thornton, 
“Reply to ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529.  To 
commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Hogg and Bushell article, the Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal dedicated a special edition to “Charter Dialogue: Ten Years Later” led off 
by Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell & Wade K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited – 
Or “`Much Ado About Metaphors`” (2007) 45(1) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1.  This 
volume includes commentaries by Richard Haigh & Michael Sobkin, Christopher 
Manfredi, Carissima Mathen, Andrew Petter and Kent Roach as well as a reply from 
Hogg, Bushell & Wright.  The Supreme Court of Canada has embraced the concept of 
dialogue.  See e.g. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at paras. 137-39, 178; M. v. H., 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 328; Corbiere v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 at para. 116; R. 
v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 at paras. 20, 57, 125; Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. 
Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R 1120 at para. 268; Bell ExpressVu v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at 
paras. 65-66; Harper v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 at para. 37. 
 
65 See e.g. Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and Legalization of Politics in 
Canada, rev. ed. (Toronto: Thomson Educational Publishing, 1994); Allan Hutchinson, 
Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1995); Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
66 See e.g. F.L. Morton & R. Knopf, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party 
(Toronto: Broadview Press, 2000). 
 
67 See Hogg, supra note 48 at 36.4(b).  See also Peter W. Hogg, “The Charter Revolution: 
Is it Undemocratic?” (2001) 12 Constitutional Forum 1; Robin Elliot, “The Charter 
Revolution and the Court Party: Sound Critical Analysis or Blinkered Political Polemic” 
(2002) 35 U.B.C. Law Rev. 271. 
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and the role of the courts.  In contrast to American constitutional 
scholarship, Canadian attempts at grand theoretical justification for 
judicial review are exceedingly rare.68  For the Charter’s first fifteen 
years, the debate was largely between a small cadre of scholars on the left 
who view the courts as essentially conservative power structures that are 
unlikely to bring about progressive social change and a similarly small 
group of right-wing critics who continued to fight for deference to 
parliamentary supremacy which was abandoned as a conscious policy 
choice in the adoption of the Charter in 1982.  The large majority of 
constitutional scholars supported the Charter project.  Over the last 
decade, the debate has changed somewhat and focused on “judicial 
activism” and what that means and whether or not Canadian courts are 
activist.69  The original Charter critics have remained, adapting their 
stances somewhat.  However, a growing number of Charter supporters 
have lamented the courts’ failure to exercise judicial review more 
aggressively and more frequently. 
 In sum, the debate in Canada has not been over the threshold 
question of the democratic legitimacy of judicial review but rather over its 
appropriate scope and boundaries.  Moreover, this debate has largely been 
confined to legal and academic circles and infrequently enters the public 
forum in the manner that it does in the United States.  Canada’s leading 
constitutional scholar has explained that “the controversy about the 
political role of the [Supreme Court of Canada] has mainly taken place in 
academic journals, books and conferences.  The public controversy about 
the role of the highest court that has become the standard fare of politics in 
the United States is muted and sporadic in Canada.  It is not clear whether 
this is because Canadians are more respectful of their Court, or because 
they are less disturbed by the anti-majoritarian outcomes.  It may be a bit 
                                                 
68 For one early such account see Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The 
Charter, Federalism, and the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).  See 
also David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1995) and David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
 
69 See e.g. “Are Judges Too Powerful?” (April 1999) 20 Policy Options 3-4, 6-39 
(containing articles by Hon. Bertha Wilson, Peter Russell, E. Preston Manning, Peter W. 
Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, F.L. Morton, Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, Rainer Knopff, 
and Sébastien Lebel-Grenier). 
 




of both.”70  The legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter is 
generally accepted in Canada and Canadians are not particularly interested 
in debating the subject, one way or the other. 71 
 
B. SOUTH AFRICA’S CONSCIOUS EMBRACE OF RIGHTS  
  
In South Africa, the Question of Legitimacy is even more muted 
than in Canada.  Under apartheid, judicial review was almost non-
existent.72  Anti-apartheid activists and legal scholars generally expressed 
frustration or indictment with the general failure of the judiciary to protect 
the rights of freedoms of apartheid’s victims.73  The South African debate 
over the legitimacy of judicial review is largely a historical one.  Attempts 
by the white opposition during the apartheid years to enact a bill of rights 
with judicial review failed.  The apartheid Government used the bogeyman 
of Lochner as part of its justification for opposing judicial review.  
Initially, the African National Congress (ANC) opposed judicial review, 
preferring instead to rely on the principle of unfettered majoritarianism.  
                                                 
70 Hogg, supra note 48 at s. 36.4(b). 
 
71 The attempt by Liberal Prime Minister to inject a debate over the use of the 
notwithstanding clause into the 2006 Canadian election was largely considered an act of 
political desperation and not a subject in which the public was particularly interested.  
See Wells, supra note 53 at 221-22 (stating that Prime Minister Martin had reached out 
“to an incredibly narrow demographic” and the proposal “excited almost no Canadian”). 
_  
72 The only exercise of judicial review occurred in the 1950s in a constitutional crisis over 
entrenched provisions of the South Africa Act, 1909 which functioned as South Africa’s 
constitution between 1910 and 1960.  On these events see generally John Dugard, 
“Toward Racial Justice in South Africa” in Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal, 
Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 349 at 357-61; Henry John May, The 
South African Constitution, 3rd ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1955) at 50-56; 
T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, 4th ed. (Toronto and Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 1991) at 329-43. 
 
73 See e.g. John Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978); David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging 
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However, as the anti-apartheid struggle increasingly became embedded in 
the international human rights movement, the ANC embraced the 
enactment of a constitutional bill of rights enforced through the exercise of 
judicial review.  By the time of the constitutional negotiations of the early 
1990s, as Schor recognizes, both black and white South Africans 
supported the establishment of judicial review and the 
constitutionalization of rights – although for different reasons.  For Black 
South Africans – represented to the largest degree by the ANC -- a 
constitutional bill of rights anchored in the power of judicial review 
became almost an article of faith.  White South Africans became quick 
converts to a constitutional bill of rights backed by judicial review as a 
means to protect their minority rights and de facto privileges.74 
 The structure of the South African constitution also severely 
diminishes the Question of Legitimacy.  The interim constitution that 
governed the transition from apartheid to democracy explicitly and in the 
clearest of language provided for the establishment of a Constitutional 
Court with the power to declare legislation invalid to the extend of the 
inconsistency with the Constitution and that any such declaration was 
binding on all executive, legislative and judicial organs of state.75  The 
interim Constitution also contained a supremacy clause declaring the 
Constitution to be “the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act 
inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly 
or by necessary implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect 
to the extent of the inconsistency.”76  Similar provisions were carried over 
into the final Constitution now applicable in South Africa.77   
                                                 
74 See African National Congress, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South 
Africa (1988), reprinted in (1989) 12 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 322; Albie Sachs, 
Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 
1990). 
 
75 See S.A. Constit. 1993, s. 99(4)-(5). 
 
76 S.A. Constit. 1993, s. 4. 
 
77 See S.A. Constit., s. 1 (Founding Values), s. 2 (Supremacy of the Constitution). S. 167 
(jurisdiction of Constitution Court). 
 




While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms exerted 
significant influence on the drafting of the South African Bill of Rights,78 
the framers of South Africa’s constitution chose not to adopt a 
notwithstanding clause which is not surprising given the rarity of such 
provisions in constitutions around the world and the concern from the 
apartheid-era that unbridled parliamentary supremacy failed to protect 
rights and freedoms of unpopular groups.  However, given the ability of 
the South African parliament to amend most of the Constitution with a 
two-thirds vote79 – a figure that the ANC has effectively obtained in each 
of the three elections since 199480 -- no notwithstanding mechanism is 
required to keep the legislature in the constitutional conversation.  
Moreover, because of this relative ease to amend the Constitution, the 
                                                 
78 See D.M. Davis, “Constitutional borrowing: The influence of legal culture and and 
local history on the reconstitution of comparative influence: the South African 
experience” (20003) 1 Interantional Journal of Constitutional Law 181 at 186-87, 191; 
Jeremy Sarkin, “The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South 
Africa’s bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions” (1998) 1 U. Pa. J. 
of Constitutional Law 176 at 181, 196.  See generally Adam M. Dodek, “The Protea and 
the Maple Leaf: The Impact of the Charter on South African Constitutionalism” (2004) 
17 National Journal of Constitutional Law 353. 
 
79 See S.A. Constit. of 1996, s. 74(2) and (3) (providing that most provisions of the 
Constitution can be amended by a vote of 2/3rd of the National Assembly and at least six 
(of nine) provinces).  Provisions amending the founding provisions of the Constitution 
(chapter 1) and the amendment provision itself, require at least a 75% level of support.  
Ibid., s. 74(1). 
 
80 In the 1994 election, the ANC alone received 252 /400 seats (63%).  An additional 16 
votes were required to reach the 2/3 required to amend the Constitution (268/400).  This 
could have been achieved with the addition of either partner in the Government of 
National Unity: the National Party (82) or the Inkatha Freedom Party (43 seats). See 
Independent Electoral Commission, Results of the 1994 National Elections online: 
http://www.elections.org.za/Elections94.asp.  In 1999, the ANC received 66.35% of the 
national vote, just short of the 2/3rds required to amend the Constitution on its own.  See 
Independent Electoral Commission, Results of the 1999 National Elections online: 
http://www.elections.org.za/results/natperparty.asp.  In 2004, the ANC did obtain the 
2/3rds necessary to amend the Constitution without the support of any other parties, 
receiving 69.69% of the vote.  See Independent Electoral Commission, Results of the 
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problem of legitimacy of judicial review is far less acute in South Africa 
than in the United States. 
Any lingering doubts about the legitimacy of judicial review were 
put to rest by President Mandela after the Constitutional Court released 
one of its first judgments, holding the death penalty unconstitutional under 
South Africa’s new Constitution.81  The decision was divisive and Deputy 
President F.W. de Klerk, expressing the wide support for the death penalty 
among the country’s white population, denounced the Constitutional 
Court’s decision and called for a national referendum on the subject.  
President Mandela responded in a characteristically shrewd yet sage 
fashion.  Speaking directly to de Klerk and the country’s population in a 
televised address, Mandela stated that he had no problem with a 
referendum on the death penalty so long as another question was added to 
the ballot: whether the white population should return all the land that was 
taken from indigenous Africans.  This response effectively quelled any 
talk of referenda to overturn unpopular court decisions.  Mandela’s 
message was clear: we live in a constitutional democracy now where the 
Constitutional Court exercises the power of judicial review and we accept 
the legitimacy and the validity of the court’s decisions.82 
 In its judgments, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has 
exercised the power of judicial review cautiously, with a distinct 
appreciation of the enormity of the challenges faced by the Executive and 
the Legislature in South Africa.  A case in point is the TAC case83 where 
the Constitutional Court ordered the government to provide anti-HIV 
drugs to pregnant women but refused the request to grant a structural order 
which would have maintained court supervision over the development and 
implementation of government health policy in this area.  To some, the 
Constitutional Court’s performance has been a source of disappointment in 
the Court’s deference to the ANC government.  To others, this simply 
                                                 
81 See S v. Makwanyane (1995) 3 SA 391, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
 
82 This episode is related by Ronald Dworkin in Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer, eds., 
Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An International Conversation (New York & 
London: New York University Press, 2004) at 34-35. 
 
83  MINISTER OF HEALTH AND OTHERS V TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN AND OTHERS  [2002] 
ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033. 
 




reflects the recognition that the courts have a limited ability to effect 
significant social change.  Other see the Court as out of touch with the 
country’s high crime rate.  In sum, South Africa consciously adopted 
judicial review under its Constitution and created a new Constitutional 
Court entirely dedicated to this responsibility.  Judicial review operates in 
a completely different context in South Africa than in the United States. 
 
C.   ISRAEL: JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION 
 I 
Israel’s constitutional status has long been anomalous, deserving of 
its own colour on any constitutional map.  Israel’s constitutional history 
has been marked by continued debate over whether to adopt a formal 
written constitution.  A constitution is a means both of expressing 
universalist and particularist values and accommodating tensions between 
them.  In Israel’s case, it has never been able to reach the necessary level 
of consensus on how to accommodate these competing values.84  Israel’s 
constitutional history, political and legal culture and constitutional 
structure has created an environment where the Question of Legitimacy 
operates quite differently than in the United States. 
 Israel is atypical in that judicial review preceded the recognition of 
a constitution.  Consequently, the dominant issue in Israel has been the 
constitutional one and judicial review has been a second-order issue.  Over 
the past ten to fifteen years, the defining issue in Israeli constitutional 
politics has been and continues to be judicial activism with judicial review 
being but one of several issues that fall under this rubric. 
After achieving independence in 1948, Israel deferred the adoption 
of a formal constitution, electing to build its constitution chapter by 
chapter through a series of “Basic Laws”.   For the next five decades, 
scholars focussed on questions such as what was the status of the basic 
laws?  What was the authority of Israel’s Parliament to enact constitutional 
legislation?  Did the Supreme Court have the power of judicial review?85   
                                                 
84  But see Michael Mandel, “Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel” (1999) 
33 Israel Law Review 259 at 274 (arguing that the failure to adopt a constitution in Israel 
was attributable to “ . . . the hegemony of labour at the helm of a strong state and the 
relative weakness of capital. . .”). 
 
85 See G. Gross, “The Constitutional Question in Israel” in D.J. Elazar, ed. 
Constitutionalism: The Israeli and American Experiences (Lanham, Md: University Press 
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During this time Israel’s Supreme Court developed a “judicial bill of 
rights” in the absence of a formal bill of rights and judicial review over 
legislation.86  The Supreme Court exercised judicial review without a 
constitution and under certain “entrenched” provisions of several Basic 
Laws but the recognition of judicial review under a constitutional 
document did not take root until 1995. 
In a 1995 decision, the Supreme Court declared that Israel had a 
constitution, that the constitution was largely contained in Israel’s Basic 
Laws and that the Supreme Court had the power of judicial review over 
legislation and could strike down laws inconsistent with a Basic Law.87  
Having assumed the power of judicial review, as of October 2007 the 
Supreme Court of Israel has only exercised it to strike down legislation on 
six occasions since 1995.  This is not for want of opportunity as the 
Supreme Court of Israel hears thousands of cases each year.88  Judicial 
                                                                                                                         
of America and Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1990) 51 at 70.  On these 
questions, see Amnon Rubinstein, “Israel’s Piecemeal Constitution” 1966) 16 Scripta 
Hierosolymintana  201; and Claude Klein, "A New Era in Israel's Constitutional Law"  
(1971) 6 Israel Law Review 117.  On the issue of judicial review see M. B. Nimmer, 
"The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel's Quest for a Constitution" (1970) 70 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1217; E. Likhovski, "The Courts and the Legislative Supremacy of the Knesset" 
(1968) 3 Israel Law Review 345; E.S. Likhovski, The Knesset: Israel’s Parliament 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) at 73-103; A.A. Bergman, "The Supremacy of the 
Knesset" (1971) 6 Israel Law Review 117.  On the Knesset's authority to enact 
constitutional legislation see Likhovski, The Knesset, ibid. at 216-223 and Ruth Gavison, 
"The Controversy  Over Israel's Bill of Rights" (1985) 15 Israel Y.B. on H.R. 113.  The 
Supreme Court tackled these issues head on in the Gal Law decision, infra note 87.  
Whether they resolved them is another issue.  Because a determination of the issues was 
not necessary to the resolution of the case, the Court's 519 page examination of these 
issues may be the longest example of obiter dicta in history. 
 
86 Gary L. Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 9-10.   
 
87 See C.A. 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Co-operative Village (1995) 
49 (iv) P.D. 221 (known as "the Gal Law case").  A partial English translation and 
editorial commentary can be found at (1997) 31 Israel Law Review 764.  A complete 
English translation is forthcoming in the Israel Law Reports which should also become 
available on the Supreme Court of Israel’s website at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html. 
 




review in Israel is always controversial but that is more a function of its 
rarity than its frequency. 
 Simply put, judicial review is not the question of legitimacy in 
Israel that it is in the United States.  In Israel, the question is the Supreme 
Court’s activism; judicial review is only one element in this larger issue.  
The heated debate on judicial activism and the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court of Israel preceded Israel’s 1995 constitutional “moment” and has 
continued thereafter.  Far more important and controversial has been the 
Supreme Court of Israel’s exercise of judicial review over administrative 
action and political decisions as well as the expansion of the Court’s 
jurisdiction and the doctrine of standing.89  The debate and the questioning 
of the Court’s legitimacy is very much about what Michael Mandel and 
others would term “the legalization of politics.”90  In 2007, Israel’s 
reform-minded Justice Minister, former law professor Daniel Friedmann, 
                                                                                                                         
88  In 2005, over 12,000 petitions were filed with the Supreme Court.  See Judicial 
Authority, Annual Report 2005 (Jerusalem: 2006) 11 (Hebrew) online: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/info/DochRashut2005.pdf.  The High Courts of the other 
countries discussed in this paper hear in the double digits of cases each year, at times 
breaking a hundred.  On Canada, see Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: 
Special Edition – Statistics 1996 to 2006 (Ottawa: Supreme Court of Canada, 2007), 
online: http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/download/ecourt.pdf.  On the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, see Michael Bishop, “Constitutional Court 
Statistics for the 2005 Term” (2006) 22 SAJHR 518 at 518-29 (noting that in 2005, the 
Court delivered 24 judgments, 22 judgments in 2004, 25 in 2003, 34 in 2002; 25 in 2001, 
28 in 1999, 19 in 1998, 21 in 1997, 20 in 1996 and 14 in 1995).  On the United States 
Supreme Court, see SCOTUSblog StatPack, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/SuperStatPack.pdf (for the October 
Term (OT) 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 68 cases, 71 in 0T 2005, 76 in OT 
2004, 74 in OT 2003, 73 in OT 2002, etc.). 
 
89 See e.g. Shimon Shetreet, “Standing and Justiciability” in Itzhak Zamir & Allen 
Zysblat, Public Law in Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 265; David Kretzmer, 
“The Supreme Court and Parliamentary Supremacy” in Zamir & Zysblat, ibid. at 303; 
Ruth Gavison, Mordechai Kremnitzer & Yoav Dotan, Judicial Activism: For and Against 
– The Role of the High Court of Justice in Israeli Society (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
2002) (Hebrew). 
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embarked on a campaign to limit the power of the Supreme Court.  In a 
wide-ranging interview in August 2007, Friedmann listed his targets as (1) 
curbing excessive prosecutorial zeal against politicians; (2) lack of 
oversight of certain prosecutorial decisions of the Attorney General; (3) 
intervention by the High Court in political appointments; (4) questions of 
justiciability; (5) the process for selecting justices and the composition of 
the Judicial Election Committee; (6) the need for a legislative override of 
court decisions; (7) the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; (8) limiting the 
scope of the judicial doctrine of “reasonableness”; and (9) the role of the 
Chief Justice. 91  From this varied and extensive list, it is possible to get a 
sense of the range of the debate over judicial activism in Israel and how 
the exercise of judicial and reactions thereto (such as mooting the 
introduction of a legislative override) is simply one element in a much 
larger debate. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF UNIVERSALIZING 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
In mapping comparative judicial review, we need to recognize the 
limits of universalizing the Question of Legitimacy from the particular 
American experience.  If we do not, we risk replicating some of the 
perceptual biases from the Cold War Map of the 1980s that my High 
School Social Studies teacher showed us.  As North American 
comparative constitutional law scholars, we are prone to exaggerate the 
significance of judicial review because of the strong influence of 
American doctrine on the subject.  We need to understand the 
constitutional system “from the inside”92 in order to accurately map out 
judicial review comparatively.  We need to be able to accurately depict the 
phenomenon of judicial review in each system before mapping the larger 
phenomena comparatively.  Schor is quite careful in recommending a 
contextual approach; he is consistently critical of polar theories – single-
                                                 
91 Orit Schohat & Ze’ev Segal, “Saving the High Court from itself” Ha’arets (18 August 
2007), online: www.haaretz.com . 
 
92 See Günter Frankenberg, “Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law” 
(1985) 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 411. 
 




explanation theories for the rise of judicial review and other related 
phenomena.  He rightly states that comparative constitutional law is an 
enterprise in which scholars seek to lay bare the foundations of 
constitutionalism. 
 In mapping judicial review, we need to distinguish between 
judicial review and the larger phenomena of the global expansion of 
judicial power.  The global expansion of judicial power refers to “the 
infusion of judicial decision-making and of courtlike procedures into 
political arenas where they did not previously reside.  To put it briefly, we 
refer to the “judicialization of politics.”93   Judicial review is one element 
– judicialization from without.  There are also other forms of 
judicialization from within.94  As noted in the Israeli case, we need to 
distinguish between constitutional judicial review and administrative 
judicial review.  One possible remedy can be found in my first map, the 
one that I saw in the Mapparium in Boston.  In that map, ocean depths 
were noted by darker and lighter shades of blue.  We need to use a similar 
conceptual shading in looking comparatively at judicial review in 
countries around the world. 
Carl Friedrich wrote that “[c]omparative constitutionalism seeks to 
determine the theoretical presuppositions and institutional manifestations 
of constitutional systems.”95  American politics is notably constitution-
centred96 and fixated on the Question of Legitimacy.  While the United 
States provided the prototype for judicial review which many other 
countries have consciously adopted, it is a mistake to assume that the 
debate surrounding its legitimacy necessary migrated with it.  Each system 
that has adopted judicial review has done so in its own manner.  The 
American debate over the Question of Legitimacy is a useful framework 
                                                 
93 Torbjörn Vallinder, “When the Courts Go Marching In” in C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn 
Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power, eds. (New York & London: New 
York University Press, 1995) 13 at 13. 
 
94 See ibid. at 16.  
 
95 Carl J. Friedrich, Limited Government: A Comparison (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1974) 11. 
 
96 See Martin Shapiro, “The United States” in C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, The 
Global Expansion of Judicial Power, eds. (New York & London: New York University 
Press, 1995) 43 at 43. 
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for probing the particular narrative of judicial review in a given 
jurisdiction but it should not subvert that analysis.  Cappelletti mused that 
the solution to the mighty problem is to be found in a given society’s 
“history and traditions, the particular demands and aspirations of the 
society, its political structures and processes, and the kind of judges it has 
produced.”97  In the case of comparative judicial review, there is a limit to 
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